Although ceasefires have been anviled with a number of insurgent outfits in the Northeast, robust follow-up mechanisms have—for one reason or the other—circuited the processes that have led up to it. This has led to prolonged periods of ceasefire, engendering thereby a sense of not only uneasiness among the once warring groups, but it has also acted as a “stalling-strategy” for militant outfits that have been waiting in the wings to enter into dialogue. The lament that is making the rounds is, “If there has been no perceptible solution to the high-profile Naga problem, which will complete 28 years on 1 August 2025, lesser groups would certainly be caught in a greater traffic jam.”
Indeed, in a sense, the grievance is not wholly without substance. Cessation of hostilities between a state and a non-state group should follow a series of steps which leads to a comprehensive resolution. The path, which a peace process normally takes after a ceasefire is instituted, is expected to be less unwieldy than the one that precedes a ceasefire. Whereas the dynamics that could govern the pre-ceasefire stage can be a long-drawn-out affair, with protracted in camera parleys, entry and engagement of intermediaries, mediators, and intelligence agencies, an ably managed post-ceasefire situation should ideally result in early resolution. As a matter of fact, prolongation of a post-ceasefire period—prior to resolution—is deemed unnecessary, as much of the groundwork on which a future resolution would be structured should have already been established preceding a formal cessation of hostility. Indeed, it is analyzed that in its haste to cobble out ceasefire arrangements, the state has not quite taken into consideration certain imperatives that should govern such agreements.
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But the flip side also suggests that the aspects that govern cessation of hostilities and consequently resolution have invariably encountered a number of spoilers. External forces inimical to India have tried their utmost to derail peace processes. Belligerence in the Northeast, for instance, appeals to the strategic calculus of China, Pakistan, and of late, even Bangladesh after Yunus’s uncalled-for statement about the Northeast being landlocked, even as such countries seek to pin down the Indian army to the region and away from both their primary duties in the border and the growing intransigence in Kashmir, where the real battle is raging. However, the gaffe which the state seems to be continually making is by tom-tomming its piecemeal achievements. The most glaring of instances was the decade-old “Framework Agreement” of 2015.
Shrouded in secrecy, the “historic” agreement was not only kept away from the public, but it gave rise to myriad suspicion. Furthermore, it is yet to be understood as to why a “Framework Agreement” had to be signed in the first place, and with so much fanfare, especially if it were to be kept a secret. The only rational explanation seems to be that the state wanted to “inform” the rest of the country that conflict in its eastern borderlands has been resolved, when in effect it was not the case. If this perception is true, then it is not only an unsound policy, but one that is fraught with grave danger to India’s national security. After all, all that has been achieved since the “historic” agreement is suspicion, criticism, and inter-group rivalry.
The ignominy with which the “Framework Agreement” of 2015 (which could have been the correct initiator for a comprehensive peace arrangement) and its scrivener, R.N. Ravi, had to be jettisoned is a clear example of an observable fact that could have been sensibly avoided! If secrecy was the key factor in the “Framework Agreement” motivation, it is not understood, as aforesaid, as to why there was so much tom-tomming of the “riddle wrapped up in an enigma” when it was signed on 3 August 2015 in the presence of the Prime Minister.
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Also, in the process of wooing the NSCN (IM) and alienating the NSCN (K), precious lives have been lost. The attack on the Dogra soldiers in Manipur’s Chandel on 4 June 2015 is an important case in point.
The turf has become murkier with insurgent organizations such as the (Manipur) Valley-Based Insurgent Groups having come into an agreement with the Myanmar army after the 1 February 2021 putsch in Myanmar. While the “understanding” has been analyzed to be a marriage of convenience, the fact of the matter is that it has engineered an about-face for Indian security management. Whereas, in the pre-1 February 2021 scenario, Naypyidaw—at the behest of New Delhi—had acted against the Indian Insurgent Groups (IIG) billeted in Myanmar by way of two robust military operations, Op Sunrise I and II, the present poses a 180-degree turn with the insurgents acting in tandem with the same dispensation which the Indian state had hoped to utilize against the North East insurgents.
The NSCN (IM) continues to recruit, train, procure arms, and even maintain camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar, where they regularly send their cadres on long-range patrols. Therefore, even as the peace dividend seems to have paid off, it must be understood that non-resolution of the Naga issue is creating an atmosphere in the region whereby long-term national security interests are being hurt.
The danger stems primarily from the manner in which NSCN (IM) and their proxies are charting and carrying out a war of attrition in certain parts of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Manipur. The geo-political engineering that it is carrying out in Manipur is in ample evidence, the time-tested NSCN (IM) approach being to hold the state to ransom by putting on economic blockades, and cutting the region from the rest of India. Indeed, this time around it seems to be making the most of the unrest in Manipur by aiding the insurgent groups of both denominations—Meitei and Kuki—who are warring with each other. The NSCN (IM) camps in Myanmar’s Somra Tracts are being used as a conduit for the insurgents from Sagaing Division and beyond to enter Manipur.
In Arunachal Pradesh, it engages the populace with Operation Salvation, a clear strategy to grab territory by converting the animistic tribes in the districts of Tirap, Changlang, and Longding into Christianity. The politics of the three districts are also so weighed down by the Nagas (both NSCN (IM) and different actions of the NSCN (K), which was once locally known as the Naya and the Purana parties: the NSCN (IM)’s entrance was after the NSCN (K) had entered the area) that the seismicity is being felt across the region.
In Assam it courted the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD), having signed a “Hebron Agreement.” Cessation of hostilities with DHD has in no way lessened either the alliance with the Naga outfit, or has brought “durable peace” to the expanse.
Furthermore, the NSCN (IM) is attempting to elbow into other areas by entering into alliances with other insurgent groups in order to extend its area of influence, and has in the past set up umbrella organizations with an avowed objective of starting a unified move against the Indian state. The United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters, a front that included the ULFA, the DHD, the United People’s Democratic Solidarity, PLA of Manipur etc., was one such attempt. Yet another was when the Self Defence United Front of South East Himalayan Region was formed to coordinate the activities of groups such as NDFB, National Liberation Front of Tripura, and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup. The prolongation of the ceasefire—although it may be considered to be a “wearing down” strategy by some—would allow the formation of a “coalition of the willing” and make insurgent groups in the region more belligerent.
But the fact of the matter is that New Delhi has few options available to it in the face of the intransigence that the NSCN (IM) is showcasing, especially its demand for Greater Nagalim, and a separate flag and constitution. Indeed, not only have the state legislatures of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Manipur passed resolutions against the giving up of territory, but even the central government seems committed against any further territorial demarcation of the North East, and certainly a separate constitution and a flag.
But, even as the NSCN (IM) is quiet about its demand on sovereignty, its leadership knows that it must at least appropriate territory that is Naga dominated and inform at least a section of its parish that Greater Nagalim has become a reality. Otherwise, its raison d’être would be questioned by its constituency, who have sacrificed much in the almost eight-decade-long insurgency. Indeed, this aspect is particularly important for the NSCN (IM) general secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah. His real following is in the hill districts of Manipur, and in the Tangkhul tribe—of which he is a member—and it is nigh impossible that this tribe is left out of a deal that may be worked out. Muivah and his hardcore followers would, therefore, resort to a variety of subterfuges in order to attain footholds in areas that they feel are traditionally theirs.
One aspect that has been noticed is the changing character of the Indian army and the Assam Rifles in the North East. In the past the two able arms of the Indian state were able to maintain peace in Nagaland and Manipur against all odds. But of late (especially since August 2024!) the two noble forces have been adopting a posture that can be characterized as strange.
After a lull and much behind-the-scenes politicking to usher in peace (including a Chief Minister stepping down!), unrest and violence has erupted again in Manipur and South Arunachal Pradesh. The stage looks like an absurd drama that has been scripted in the shabbiest of manners. Today, there is news of firefight between the Assam Rifles and the Peoples’ Defence Force (PDF) of Myanmar in Manipur’s Chandel district. It is being queried by many as to whose side New Delhi is on: the Tatmadaw or the National Unity Government of which PDF is the fighting arm. Complete reigns at the time of publication.
As for Nagaland, there has been no headway in the peace process. The late NSCN (IM)’s president, Isac Chisi Swu’s son Ikato Chisi Swu left the NSCN (IM) to join hands with expelled NSCN (IM) leaders such as Lt Gen (Retd) H.S. Ramsan and Lt Gen. Absalom Raman. It is becoming quite clear that the NSCN (IM) cadres billeted in Myanmar will not agree to a peace resolution with New Delhi. The Naga story of belligerence against India, therefore, is being allowed to continue. While there is no clear indication as to why the imbroglio has come to such a pass, fingers of accusation are being pointed in the direction of the Indian army leadership which observers have stated are clueless about the intricacies of the Naga problem. The unfortunate aspect also seems to stem from the fact that the current Indian army and Assam Rifles leadership do not want to be educated as well.
While the strategy should not be to split groups and encourage dissonance, the aspect that may be academically utilized is the fact that tribes of Nagaland do not take too kindly to the Tangkhuls of Manipur. For instance, is the dream to integrate the Naga-dominated districts of Manipur into Greater Nagalim only that of Muivah’s? Has an intensive study been undertaken in order to find out what the Semas, Aos, Angamis, Lothas, and other tribes inside Nagaland feel about incorporating Tangkhul dominated areas of Manipur into Greater Nagalim? It has also been reported that Tangkhul domination in the NSCN (IM) is not a feature that is appreciated in Nagaland.
There are other aspects that may come to the fore if timely steps are not taken to resolve the issue. The Naga movement has in the past been actively aided by China, Pakistan, and unfriendly regimes of Bangladesh. It is a possibility that inimical interests might once again fish in troubled waters. Indeed, the memory of the NSCN (IM)’s Political Commissar, Anthony Shimray’s arrest some years ago as a result of gun-running with the Chinese, is still fresh.
Indeed, the Chinese-Bangladesh (especially with the latter taking the anti-India path of late!) connection is still robust and will continue to be a factor in the NSCN (IM)’s agenda. The Naga outfit had successfully internationalized the Naga issue. It had joined organizations such as The Hague-based Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization and a Netherlands-based NGO called Kreddha. It has been reported that its executive director, Michael Van Walt Van Praag, had chaperoned the NSCN (IM)’s anti-India subterfuges.
It is also being reported that the NSCN (IM) had demanded a “third-party” negotiation on 8 November 2024. The peace process, in an already restive North East, may get more mired in controversy were third parties to enter the fray. The most important step that New Delhi should anvil immediately is the appointment of a full-time interlocutor. 21 Members of Parliament had urged the Union Home Minister, Amit Shah, to “provide a detailed update” in the Parliament on the “stalled Naga Peace Process.”
The author also wishes to take the opportunity of psycho-profiling a belligerent group before it enters into a ceasefire: an imperative that might have escaped the high offices of New Delhi. It must be understood that a heightened sense of caution guides belligerent parties before they enter into a political reconciliation process. The primary concern of such groups is whether the stronger party—as asymmetry characterizes almost all cases of conflict between belligerents and constituted authority—would permit an honorable solution, which would be acceptable to the belligerent group and the constituency it seeks to represent.
Such groups also exercise caution as they sense that a coaxed entrance into a political process could be a ploy of the stronger party to “wear them out” by engaging them in protracted negotiations. But notwithstanding such predicaments, compromises are often made when a belligerent party perceives a stalemate in the movement and when conflict fatigue begins to set in, as also when they realize that the populace among which they operate are building consensus to force the belligerents to enter into a dialogue.
In such scenarios, belligerents try to shape the environment in an array of ways, which may range from escalating the level of violence to internationalizing the movement. The motivation is to force the stronger party to open channels for dialogue as the moves of the belligerent party become increasingly unacceptable. However, the movement from intention to actual institution of political process is usually long drawn: most belligerent groups put forward conditions that may not be acceptable to the stronger party. But non-acceptable conditions are usually made only by way of bargaining counters, with a comprehension that a climb-down to acceptable conditions would eventually take place, and ones which were actually intended by the belligerents. Sincerity of both parties to resolve conflict by adhering to the principle of mutual accommodation and by prolonging the peace dividend when fighting ends is crucial at this stage.
This is primarily because of not only the possibility that subterfuges may be engineered by hardliners among belligerents who feel that they will not be given their due in a post-settlement scenario, but also because of the presence of—as aforesaid—spoiling efforts by vested interests. Back-channeling and secret parleys with earnest mandate are best suited to navigate the process at such junctures: publicity normally results in devious objectives coming into play, derailing the political process in its infancy.
The sense of mistrust that prevails among the stakeholders of the Naga Peace Process and the growing antagonism between people that should have come together to cobble out a solution that is all-inclusive has become the most palpable of banes. The manner in which the dialogue has careened out of control when it could have been salvaged is an observable fact that has dawned upon all right-thinking observers. All-inclusive charity and correct confidence-building should have guided state action. The ad-hocism that has hitherto characterized the manner in which the state has been ordaining for the longest running insurgency in the world is a theme that clearly eludes reason.
Comprehension of such sage articulation and course correction demands that a correct mustering exercise be undertaken. Even as the Naga people and the other on-looking groups await Raisina Hill’s offer, the most important aspect that the state should be examining is the immediate anviling of a peace committee headed by a non-partisan personage such as former Union Home Secretary, G.K. Pillai. His knowledge of the North East is extraordinary and he commands great respect among the people of the North East. Other equally astute negotiators such as the Chief Minister of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, and former GOC, 3 Corps, Lt Gen (Retd) Arun Kumar Sahni, could be incorporated into such a group. After all, quite clearly the aftermath of a “compromise” that would be offered may not gratify all stakeholders and there could be murmurings of dissatisfaction in the region. In such a setting, there would be need for a set of people—without state moorings—who would be able to act as a “composing buffer” and ferry the message that a “war” is truly ending. The group can also act as both shields and safeguards in the extremely crucial period that characterizes the “end-of-the-road” scenario.
Despite V.S. Atem being touted as the frontrunner, the exit of Muivah from the scene might witness a “war of succession” with NSCN (IM) cadres billeted in Myanmar’s Sagaing Division choosing to stay away.
In any event, a calibrated course correction exercise should be immediately undertaken, and in right earnest. It must closely study the activities that the NSCN (IM) is presently undertaking. Most importantly, the current Indian army and Assam Rifles leadership in the region must jettison their complacence and refusal to learn. India’s national security interest in a strategically positioned zone cannot be compromised because of inanity.
Foresight and vision—if exercised with both care and caution—could well witness the gifting of a well-earned “Independence Day” present (15 August 2025) to the Naga people that would conclude the present impasse in rightful cheer.
(Jaideep Saikia is India’s foremost strategist and bestselling author)