Anirban Roy: You have recently come into prominence as a result of the theory of โLine of Amityโ that you have conceived. It has attracted much attention because of the recent events surrounding Galwan in Eastern Ladakh. How did this all come about?
Jaideep Saikia: I first conceived of the idea of the โLine of Amityโ in 2014 when I was invited to be part of the Indian delegation for โTrack II Dialogueโ with China. I am a student of securityโin the traditional senseโand for most parts my research has been about terrorism and insurgency in the Northeast and the region abutting it. I have authored and/or edited ten books and written over two dozen peer reviewed papers for national and international journals.
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Apart from a couple, almost all of them are on Islamist militancy, Bangladesh, al-Qaeda/ISIS, counter-terrorism doctrine and, of course, insurgencies in the Northeast. However, around 2001, I found myself changing gears and getting increasingly interested in the India-China boundary issue as it pertains to the eastern sector. I began reading about its history, connecting with India-China boundary experts such as Robert Sutter, Dawa Norbu, Claude Arpi and Neville Maxwell and visiting forward areas in Arunachal Pradesh.
I also got an opportunity to visit China in 2002 on the invitation of the Fudan University in Shanghai. I travelled to Beijing, Zhejiang and Shanghai where I conferred with top Chinese think tank leaders and strategic thinkers such as Ma Jiali, Wang Dehua, Chen Ruisheng (who had been Chinaโs envoy to India), Wang Hongwei, Rong Ying and Wang Nan, the last of who was then the Editor-in-Chief (International Affairs) of the Beijing based Peopleโs Daily.
I soon realized that if there is indeed a โsecurity dilemmaโ that India is faced it with then it is the boundary problem with China. The rest of the issues are mere exercises in โproblem-solvingโ. The fact that the boundary issue has been festering for so long added to my discomfiture and the sheer complexity of the problem was so overwhelming that I knew that I would be spending almost the rest of my life researching the issue.
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AR: Are you suggesting that the problem has not been correctly understood?
JS: Absolutely. I am neither a historian nor a cartographer. But I am convinced of the fact that apart from a very few, the rest of the people who comment, lecture and write about the India-China border issue have little or no idea about the ground reality. Indeed, I, too, know only โhalf-the-storyโ and am still grappling with newer insights and aspects that constitute the India-China boundary issue.
In my view, it is all very well to inform a gullible constituency that makes up 99 % of Indiaโs population that there has been an intrusion by the Peoplesโ Liberation Army (PLA) of China in a particular sector and accuse Beijing about continually โshifting its stanceโ about the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and quite another to be able to boldly state that this is the LAC upon which both India and China agree on and, therefore, has been intruded.
In reality there isnโt a well-defined one LAC. In other words, allegations have been made in an ad hoc manner, without even fathoming where the LAC is on the ground. In Bum La, for instance, it is a โheap of stonesโ which, incidentally, is an unambiguous marker. But there have been instances when patrols of each otherโs armies have criss-crossed each other despite the fact that they are generally aware about the โdisputed areasโ and โclaim linesโ.
To that end, I would say that there has never been great sanctity about the LAC in certain areas and it is possible that patrols from both sidesโat timesโhave deliberately or otherwise crossed it, leaving tell-tale signs (at least until about a decade or so ago!) in their wake! Now, I am not certain about the motivation for such courses of action: it unquestionably seems to follow an animal like behaviour of โspraying oneโs territoryโ and since there has never been formal exchange of maps (apart from the central sector!) ambiguities have continued to characterise the exact environment of oneโs territory.
This is despite the fact there are regular exercises such as Border Personnel Meetings (BPMs) between local commanders of the Indian army and the PLA where such matters are reportedly discussed. But I must inform you that even in such formal meetings (I have witnessed at least one such BPM in Bum La on 30 October 2007) there could be an element of ambiguity and denial.
For instance, the Indian army had erected a statue of the Buddha on the Indian side of the LAC in Bum La on or around 30 October 2007. I saw it when I visited Bum La for the BPM. Someone desecrated the statue on the night before the BPM leading to almost a cancellation of the event.
The Chinese denied having anything to do with the vandalisation of the sculpture and it was only after prolonged consultations with Tenga, Tezpur, Ft. William, New Delhi by the Indian army commander and I should think with Chengdu by the Chinese that the BPM finally took place. So itโs not as if everything is cut and dried even in sectors where the LAC is purportedly well-defined.
AR: But there must be a mechanism right at the top to oversee such issues?
JS: There is a โmysteriousโ China Study Group in New Delhi headed by the Foreign Secretary of India (I believe the National Security Adviser of India is heading it now after its revival post the Galwan incident), but I can assure you that the members of the Group have not even visited Guwahati in the Northeast not to speak of Chaglohagam in eastern Arunachal Pradesh where a real problem of perception on ground exists.
The problem about non-comprehension about โwhose-is-whereโ is so grave that there was a time when India blissfully gave away two strategically placed expansesโtechnically known as โFish Tailsโโto the Chinese. It was only later that the cartographic mistake was realised and the โjostleโ for space ensued.
Disputes in certain pockets such as Asaphila and Longju in the eastern sector do exist. But these are known areas and it is almost a certitude that there are ambiguities in many other places along the entire 4056 Km long India-China boundary. So there is in effect two LACs, a Chinese one and an Indian one. The hilarity of it all is that there have been agreements in the past about such blurred โLines of Actual Controlโ.
AR: Is that so about Ladakh as well?
JS: I have never been to Ladakh and cannot, therefore, comment on the manner in which the present imbroglio came to the fore with great authority, but I suspect that there is more to lโaffaire Galwan than meets the eye. The topography of Ladakh is such that there are โmajor voidsโ or โgapsโ between the patrolling areas. To that end the โperceptional differencesโ that determine the boundary are very large, a la what I referred to above about the โnon-existenceโ of a clearly demarcated LAC in certain sections. Besides, the Indian armyโuntil the incidentโwas not as densely deployed in the sector as is the case in say the Kameng sector where new Indian army elements have been deployed.
To that end, the area dominationโwhich sadly (in at least one important sense!) is what the LAC is all aboutโwas not robust, permitting thereby the PLA and the Chinese Border Guards to occupy sections that India considers to be its territory. However, the operative word in this context is โconsidersโ. In the absence of a comprehensive โafter actionโ report which I am not privy to, I have to rely on what has been stated by the Indian army, but like I said there is no clear instance of a map, boundary pillar or even a natural barrier to determine even an approximation of where the LAC was or should have been.
AR: So what according to you was the reason for the intrusion in Galwan?
JS: I have already told you that it is likely that โperceptional differencesโ graduated into a dispute. But having been said that, I think the Chinese wanted to communicate to India that โoffensive overturesโ would not be tolerated, especially as the Chinese are serious about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. I am referring to the chest-thumping that some of our experts engage in without forethought!
Incidentally, itโs not as if the Chinese can be absolved of such behaviour. They, too, have been victims of what Manjari Chatterjee Miller of Boston University calls โpost imperial ideologyโ syndrome, a state of disorientation which stems from hurtful recollections of colonialism.
Therefore, I think the episodeโquite like 1962 when the PLA reached Misamari near Tezpur only to withdraw to the Thagla ridge atop which they are perched at this pointโwas a message of sorts for India. The sadness of it all is the fact that the mess could have been avoided if India had embarked upon the sort of endeavours that the Indian army has presently embarked upon in Eastern Ladakh and have achieved.
The nation must not allow the diplomats to fritter away the advantageous position that India is currently entrenched in Eastern Ladakh. But, at the same time one must desist from taking recourse to rhetoric. Indeed, from oneโs station the phrases โRevisionist Chinaโ or โPax Sinicaโ sounds gross. It does not take much effort to raise the decibels of conflict and inform someone in Ernakulum that China has intruded into a place called Spanggur Gap in Indian territory, but the fact of the matter is that there existsโby the same tokenโphrases such as โPax Indicaโ and โUltra-Nationalist Indiaโ as well.
AR: Could you spell out the essence of the concept of โLine of Amityโ?
JS: Like I said, the idea came to my mind because of the โTrack II Dialogueโ in 2014. The status quo, albeit with the usual appendages about maintenance of peace and tranquility along the frontiers, was not progressing and I thought that a โprobeโ into the Chinese mind was warranted. The โdialogueโ was an opportunity and I felt that China might just resurrect its 1960 and 1980 east-west swap proposal, especially as the Chinese side is reportedly not unified on the issue.
I hazarded this aspect despite the fact that Beijing had already shifted the โgoalpostsโ in July 1986 and had clearly re-interpreted the โpackage dealโ by asserting that India provides โmeaningful concessionsโ to China in the east where the swathe of land is large. Indeed, according to Shyam Saran, former Foreign Secretary of India the โpackage dealโ was dead in the waters once the Chinese raised the issue about compromises in the east. He informed some of us about this about-turn during the course of a webinarโIndia-China Boundary: Eye to the Eastern Sectorโwhich I had organised on 30 August 2020.
In any event, a solution of sortsโwith an eye to circuiting the status quo that prevailsโwas proposed by me on 26-27 August 2014 during the course of the aforesaid โDialogueโ. Armed with ground based research and even communication with Chinese think tank leaders such as Shen Dingli, I sought to make good of the โas-is-where-isโ position in a sub-sector that I had been studying for a number of years.
My field visits and research informed that neither side would surrender ground in a particular sector nor would they covet areas that are being occupied by the other. The sub-sector in question is in the Kameng sector of Arunachal Pradesh and the โmarkersโ are the Thagla Ridge held by the Chinese and the Namka Chu that runs south of the Ridge by the Indians.
There has been no history of intrusion in the sub-sector and my visit to the area entailed that it is the right place for an entente cordiale to be engineered. However, a โBoundary Commissionโ would have to be constituted to formally study the area that I am referring to. But there is a clear natural barrier by way of the Namka Chu, the southern bank of which the India army is deployed. Indeed, this is one sub-sector that lends itself rather elegantly to a well-defined line which indeedโfor all intents and purposesโis also serving as one.
I merely want to take the โas-is-where-isโ basis a step further by renaming the โLine of Actual Controlโ into the โLine of Amityโ. This would naturally be an interim measure and given the length of time that even a well-meaning โBoundary Commissionโ would take before even a semblance of an International Boundary can be conceived; the pacifist in me felt that replacing the phrase โLine of Actual Controlโ by a name that does not ring of belligerence (which has been the India-China boundary mainstay for decades) would at least usher in a sense of accommodation, heralding thereby an attitude transformation in both the parties.
As a matter of fact the watershed principle that Henry McMahon had decreed in the Simla Conference of 1914 approximates the โholding lineโ in the Thagla Ridge which the Chinese presently occupies with a modicum of variation by way of what is known as the Thagla Gap.
AR: In cementing political narratives nomenclatures can play a very important role. However, changing the nomenclature โLine of Actual Controlโ may be misconstrued as a rollover of past failures onto the current establishment? How sure are we about the political will to do something on these lines?
JS: I am a student of Indiaโs national security and not a policy maker. I alsoโas I have stated many times in other forumsโdo not need to exhibit my patriotism by installing Sare Jahan Se Acha as my caller tune. I have arrived at the concept of โLine of Amityโโas explained aboveโafter due consideration to every aspects that govern the problem and to move away from what I feel is a loathsome stalemate.
India has many a mile to traverse in a variety of directions before it can reach its objective of becoming a super power. A boundary issue that can be solved without giving away even an inch of land must not hold it back from attaining that status.
Some years ago, on 25 October 2015, the late Neville Maxwell and I wrote a joint โconversation pieceโ for a newspaper. The piece was titled Between the Border Lines. It ended by suggesting the change of nomenclature that I am referring to. Let me paraphrase the last paragraph of the article. Iโafter a protracted debate with the nonagenarian author of Indiaโs China Warโsaid that substituting the belligerent sounding โLine of Actual Controlโ by terming it โLine of Amityโ would lessen the rhetoric and allow the leadership to inform their respective peoples that it is dรฉtente hour. Do you know how the late Maxwell reacted? He said, โWell, Jaideep, it should ideally be termed the Modi-Xi Lineโ.