In this exclusive interview, journalist Mahesh Deka delves into the mind of Anup Chetia, the general secretary of pro-talk ULFA, offering a rare glimpse into the insurgent group’s origins in 1978, its rise in the mid-80s, and the challenges it has faced.
This interview, originally conducted in May 2017 in Guwahati and published on the now-defunct Business Northeast, is particularly relevant today, December 29, 2023, as it coincides with the signing of the ULFA peace pact with the Centre. Northeast Now is republishing this interview in light of this historic event.
Ready for a challenge? Click here to take our quiz and show off your knowledge!
Mahesh Deka: When was ULFA established? How much truth is there in the narrative that ULFA was established on April 7, 1979, on the lawn of Ranghar?
Anup Chetia: In 1978, a national convention was organized in Namrup by Asom Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chartra Parishad (AJYP). The Biharis held significant influence in Namrup at the time, even controlling the Namrup Thermal plant’s trade union. The convention aimed to address the growing concern about the Assamese nationality facing an existential crisis and considered forming an armed rebel group.
Who took leadership in this move?
Ready for a challenge? Click here to take our quiz and show off your knowledge!
Initially, Suresh Saikia, Kamleswar Gogoi, Suren Dihingia, and Sureshwar Gogoi spearheaded the effort. They later gained control of the Namrup Thermal plant’s trade union, with Kamleswar Gogoi and Suresh Saikia becoming its president and secretary, respectively. Others played crucial roles in the preliminary groundwork, but I can’t recall their names precisely. After this groundwork, the organization was formally launched in Ranghar. We later fixed April 7 as the raising day after discussions with Pradip Gogoi in Guwahati Central Jail, though I wasn’t present at the initial formation.
It’s said you toured Assam on your bullet during the Assam Movement and built up ULFA. Is this true? If yes, please elaborate.
Though formed in 1979, ULFA’s activities were limited then. I joined in late 1979, and organizational activities were confined to certain pockets. We wanted to expand, so we contacted NSCN (K) in Nagaland and went to Burma. My team and I noticed upon returning that organizational bases hadn’t expanded. Arabinda Rajkhowa wasn’t associated with us then. I proposed involving him, as he was in another group with more activity. I actively toured Assam with Paresh Baruah, who played a key role in establishing our presence in Guwahati. ULFA truly became a full-fledged organization by early 1984.
Journalist Mahesh Deka delves into the mind of ULFA leader Anup Chetia.
Did AGP help ULFA grow during 1985-1990? What was the relationship between AGP leaders and ULFA?
Some AGP ministers and MLAs supported us, driven by nationalist sentiments and acknowledging the perceived need for such an organization in Assam’s interest. Bhrigu Kr Phukan, Prabin Gogoi, and Chandra Mohan Patoway notably helped us.
Other organizations like APLA aimed for an independent Assam but fizzled out after the Assam Accord. How did ULFA survive?
We were tasked with weakening these organizations. APLA approached us wanting to merge but demanded leadership, which we refused. We eventually brought over key APLA leaders like Munin Nabis, Sailen Dutta Konwar, and Lachit Bordoloi. Lachit Bordoli was in APLA but in the later stage, he took a neutral stand. We neutralized UNLF similarly, bringing in Indra Saikia and Deepak Saikia for training in Burma. To further strengthen our position, we created groups like KNV in Karbi Anglong, ALLA in Arunachal Pradesh, KLO, and HALC. We also initially supported ATPF financially and with training.
You were caught in Calcutta in 1991. How did that happen? And how did you get involved in negotiations despite the ongoing operation?
Yes, I was apprehended on November 17, 1991. When Operation Rhino was launched in September 1991 I was in Karbi Anglong. I came to my village on the day when Operation Rhino was started by the Army. One day, Army gheraoed our village but I managed to escape and went to Punjab. After staying some days in Punjab I moved to Khalistan and then again back to Delhi. From Delhi, I hired a taxi to Kanpur and embarked on a train to Calcutta. Coming to Calcutta was a blunder. I was apprehended immediately after I stepped into Calcutta. Police informers constantly followed me and somebody from our organization provided input to them. I was released on parole during the initial negotiation process, but the lack of consensus within ULFA led to my decision to move to Bangladesh in 1992.
How were you caught in Dhaka in 1997?
After evading arrest in Europe, I thought I was safe in Bangladesh, as other leaders moved freely. However, I was the prime target. They attempted to arrest me earlier but failed.
Did ULFA’s top brass meet you in Dhaka jail?
No, I had no contact with them from 2003 to 2008. Only my family maintained contact through letters.
In retrospect, do you think ULFA could have made a better deal during its peak in the 90s?
No, ULFA wasn’t strong enough then. However, we could have made a better deal around 2004-2006 due to our increased strength.
What, according to you, are the main reasons behind ULFA’s setback?
The setback is due to the limitation of our leadership. Many government spies joined ULFA who later on managed to become trusted lieutenants of the leaders and had misled the leadership.
In the past, ULFA has targeted writers, journalists, and activists who criticized it. Don’t you think that was a mistake?
The Central Committee did not have an endorsement of these killings. Sanjay Ghosh’s death, for instance, was a tragic accident, not a planned execution. He was meant to be warned, not harmed.
Are you in touch with Paresh Baruah? Would he come out and be a part of the negotiations?
While Paresh Baruah’s direct participation remains uncertain, we are working within the current framework to achieve progress in the negotiations.
To ensure clarity, can you reiterate ULFA’s core demands in the ongoing negotiations with the government?
Our primary demands focus on securing the constitutional rights, land rights, and political autonomy of the Assamese people.
Can you provide an update on the current stage of negotiations with the government?
While formal talks involving me are yet to commence, a draft charter outlining our demands has been prepared. We await the appointment of a new interlocutor to resume substantive discussions.
Given the lack of progress with other rebel groups in the Northeast despite years of ceasefires, do you trust the Centre’s sincerity in these negotiations?
If the government isn’t sincere, it could be difficult, but not impossible, for ULFA to revert to its previous stance. As you’ve observed, Paresh Baruah is steadily regaining strength.
Several Northeast insurgent groups have signed MoS with the government, yet implementation has been lackluster. Do you fear a similar fate for the ULFA-government talks?
Unfortunately, that possibility exists. The government has a history of employing such tactics.
NSCN (IM) claims the framework agreement with the government includes Assamese territory, which the government denies. However, the agreement remains unpublished. What are your thoughts on this?
We trust the government’s version of events.
ULFA opposes granting citizenship to Hindu Bangladeshis. Why?
We believe granting them citizenship would alter our demographic structure, something we cannot accept.
How do you view the increasing communal polarization in Assamese society since the BJP came to power?
While I can’t offer specific comments at this time, I don’t believe the Assamese people will fall prey to communal divides.
Are rumors of a rift between you and other pro-talk ULFA leaders true?
Absolutely not. There is no internal conflict within ULFA. However, it’s true that other senior leaders are not directly involved in my current efforts. I’ve primarily focused on organizing martyrs’ families and former ULFA members.
Thank you, Mr. Chetia, for your time and insights.
Thank you.