Prof. Alex Waterman from Bradford University, United Kingdom, speaks to internationally acclaimed conflict theorist & bestselling author, Jaideep Saikia, about his recently published book, “Point of Impact,” and related matters.
Alex Waterman: Jaideep, you have just published your 16th book. It has a very interesting name, “Point of Impact,” and the cover shows you aiming a sniper rifle at a distance. What sort of impact are you hoping to make this time around?
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Jaideep Saikia: Well, Alex, one would have to wait and watch for the “impact” the book might make. After all, it was published just a fortnight ago. However, as you may be aware, the book is an anthology of 60 selected articles from the surplus of essays that I have been writing and publishing on various platforms over the last four years. The articles range from the insurgencies in the Northeast to the belligerence we are experiencing in the countries bordering the region, to what I term as the “Third Wave of Radicalisation” in puritanical Islam, as well as a post-mortem of sorts about the limited conflict between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in the meadows of Baisaran in Jammu & Kashmir.
AW: I understand that the plethora of topics you have chosen to include and showcase to the public is intended to make an impact, which we all hope it would. But the cover of the book, as I pointed out in my very first question, is you aiming with a sniper rifle. Is there a symbolism we should be unearthing?
JS: Alex, I have always loved firing small arms. The Snayperskaya Vintovka Dragunova sniper rifle is a personal favorite. I have been using the weapon for a long time, at firing ranges of various Indian security forces, ever since I was a cadet at the Royal Indian Military College, Dehra Dun, where I studied and trained between 1978 and 1983 to become a soldier in the Indian army. Unfortunately, I was found to be medically unfit.
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In any event, I am gripped with a fascination that the “focus of the instant” provides when one sees nothing but the bull’s-eye before the trigger is squeezed. The phrase “Point of Impact” refers to an explicit position where two or more objects make their first connection. In the context of the book’s cover, you could say that I have subconsciously superimposed this characteristic of mine in order to identify vital focus areas or strategic choices that will have an impact on a desired goal. The topics identified in the book have been chosen with a singular objective in mind: Indiaโs national security.
AW: Apart from aspects such as insurgencies, extraneous factors that have “goaded” the small wars in the Northeast, and Indo-Pakistan and India-China relations, you have also written about what you term as the “Philosophy of Security.” Now, what is that?
JS: I am not sure that there is anything by way of such a discipline in rigorous academe. I simply dreamt it up, perhaps because I have studied Aristotle, Thomas Kuhn, and John Searle. I have, therefore, been able to fathom that there has to be a metaphysical realm where intangible aspects make healthier sense. In Indiaโs national security domain, there has to be a drshta (visionary) and a nata (actor). It is only when there is congruence of purpose between the two that victory will spew forth. After all, there can be only one verdict in a righteous war, whether it is Sindoor or the destruction of enemies that have sought to hinder growth and progress in an individual that has abided by the laws. Victory will always be on the side of God and the faithful actor, as will goodness, supremacy, and abundance. But there could be both ambiguity and ambivalence as well, when victory is proclaimed.
I have also conjured up a fire simile in the book. If it were to be superimposed on present-day Indiaโs national security, then it has to be conceived, calibrated, and harnessed in a way that the drshta not only understands what national security is all about but is also one who can dexterously strap together the ingredients that are necessary to harness it meaningfully. It is only then that the nation can not only be sustained but can also realize its full potential. Unfortunately, India has not produced such a drshta in recent times.
AW: Are you saying that India has not produced a drshta at all in recent times?
JS: Yes, in the universe of discourse where I conceive of a clear vision for India, there hasn’t been one. The late J.N. Dixit was the closest one can think of who approximated a visionary for India. Unfortunately, his successors don’t even know the tools by which his “clean accents” can be adopted.
AW: How would you, in a nutshell, meaningfully manage Indiaโs national security, especially as it pertains to the myriad insurgencies, non-state unrest, and terrorism that the country is reeling from?
JS: I have drawn up a “ready-to-act” formulation. The “battle-strategy” might seem quite simple on paper. However, the manner in which it would have to be applied is pretty complex. Recalibration and course corrections would have to be engineered in order to perfect the stratagem. But be that as it may, the schematic construction stems from the fact that a state has to (a) defend itself and its assets (in whatever form such assets may take) from a non-state actor. The latter would naturally be an organization which is backed by a political ideology (or even an enemy state) that seeks to counter the existing system. It has to then (b) destroy the organization which is seeking to threaten and overthrow the state.
The means by which this could be achieved are manifold, but it would primarily be a combination of Saam (reconciliation), Daam (monetary inducement), Dand (punitive action), and Bhed (divide). Once achieved, the ideology of the organization has to be (c) defeated by ingeniously disseminating a counter-narrative that offsets the non-state organizationโs one-time appeal/support among the populace. It is here where the human face and the ability of the state to showcase its acceptability to the governed comes into play. Lastly, the state, not content with the “temporary” destruction/defeat of the non-state organization, must ensure that the defeated organization is (d) denied the opportunity or newfound space to resurrect itself. By integrating and sequentially allowing the four “d’s” to permeate strategy, a grand strategy or a plan will emerge. But the “vision” is the most important starting point. It will regulate the “plan.” And it is such a plan that would usher in an equilibrium that has been eluding the Indian state for close to eight decades.
AW: Why have the security managers of the present not been able to internalize what you have just termed? Itโs not as if one has to master rocket science to achieve what you have so elegantly outlined.
JS: You should be asking the high security managers of India such a question. The above are perfectly doable propositions. The bitter pill might have to be chewed every so often in order to achieve the equilibrium that I am referring to. Incidentally, it is not as if there is nothingness “out there.” There are theoreticians of adroit practice and practitioners of sage theory. But for one reason or another, the security managers have either been too preoccupied with self-projection or have not thought it wise to bring about a conglomeration of collective wisdom that could have cobbled out a plan that would translate into a real-time definition of an end-state that the Indian state is groping for. Furthermore, there are actors out there whose incompetence outshines their comprehension of even the simplest things. But such people are being tolerated by the state. Why? I really canโt say!
Let me give you an example from my home state. A cut-and-dried affair.
Assam has been experiencing belligerence by way of illegal migrants and encroachers for decades. It simply needed a will and a vision, followed by decisive action to brush away the “cobwebs of an unpleasant past.” The present Chief Minister of Assam has comprehended the problem and has gotten down to the business of correct and robust housekeeping in right earnest! All right-thinking people should not only be lauding his efforts but should be lending him a helping hand. Instead, they are trying to run down his determination. Such defiance for the sake of defiance is unhealthy and does not augur well for Indiaโs nation-building exercise. Mark my words, Assam, once the dust has settled, would be a “Shangri-La.” All because of the far-sighted vision of the drshta that I am referring to.
AW: Important observers are speaking about you as the future high-order manager of Indiaโs national security. Firstly, do you harbor any such ambition? Secondly, what are the qualities that such a czar should be endowed with?
JS: Let me tell you that the people who are mouthing such things about me are only doing me a disservice. For heavenโs sake, leave me alone so that I can just read, write, and deliver an occasional lecture or two. My lifeโs mission will be completed if I can achieve the above, period!
As for the qualities that a security czar should possess, I think he or she should have (a) sound comprehension backed by ground knowledge of Indiaโs national security imperatives, (b) a vision of a strong India with a clear blueprint that can be acted upon and realized in real-time, (c) a non-partisan outlook coupled with impeccable integrity and clarity that national security is not subservient to a political ideology, (d) the ability to recognize the fault lines before they become unmanageable, (e) the intellectual capacity to cobble an iron-clad and consistent doctrine for Indiaโs national security, including counter-terrorism, (f) not be straitjacketed in a past that refuses to permit “out-of-the-box” solutions, including international negotiation that would usher in peace for India, and (g) be a reliable team leader who leads by example and commands the respect of the entire national security setup of the countryโalthough he is not expected to be omniscient, his writ pertaining to India’s national security (which would have been arrived at after great deliberation and discussion with peers) must not have opposing views that hurt the countryโs image inside and outside India, and most of all (in todayโs context) (h) should possess the courage to accept incorrect decisions and correct/redress/punish both wrongdoers, shirkers, and failures. In other words, a security czar must not be led by favoritism or “yes-manship.” Nothing can be greater than Bharat, that is, India.